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5 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Committee on Procurement of
Foreign Publications

Subject: Emergency Planning

1. The following discussion represents my personal thinking on the subject of Emergency Planning within the Intelligence Community. Since there are many imponderables and divergencies of opinion which must be considered and resolved before arriving at a firm agreed committee position in the premises, and since only a progress report is required as the first submission to the USIB Steering Committee on Emergency Planning, the following thoughts constitute merely the skelton of a concept, around which may be built more substantive planning which, integrated into other similar concepts, should result in a meaningful end product.

a. Since available guidance on planning for a "spectrum" of degrees of success in relocation is very vague, I believe that, at this stage of planning, we should plan for the worst possible eventuality, namely the initiation of general war by a surprise nuclear attack on the United States. By planning for this situation we can be sure that our planning needs under less severe conditions will be met. Future refinements in the overall governmental emergency planning field will, as a matter of course, provide for lesser degrees of attack severity.

b. In view of the extreme criticality of manpower, funds, communications, transportation, and all other facilities which will follow a nuclear attack, all echelons of all agencies engaged in emergency planning should keep their wartime demands in these areas to an absolute minimum. Consequently, in the early stages of war, the pooling of tangible assets and the reduction of duplicative effort should be maximized.

c. The primary goal of the government in the early stages of general war will be the military prosecution of that war in all theaters of operation. This will be reflected in the intelligence community by the overriding emphasis which will be devoted to all aspects of military intelligence, particularly operational intelligence. I do not mean to imply that the President, NSC, and State will be serviced through established channels by military intelligence exclusively, but rather that the great bulk of critical intelligence in the early stages of war will certainly have a strong military flavor.

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d. At a point in time, impossible to firmly fix, when the pattern of war has become established and the outlook is predictable, the emphasis on other than pure military intelligence will be reestablished. This time will roughly coincide with the commencement of a period of return to normalcy in the availability of funds, personnel, and essential services and facilities. At such a time, intelligence efforts in support of all aspects of a war-time community (other than purely military) will gain in importance. Ultimately the emphasis will be directed to intelligence in support of postwar planning.

2. Based in part on the foregoing thoughts, I recommend the following basic policy concerning the functions of PROCIB in the period following a surprise nuclear attack on the United States:


a. During the early phases of war the normal procurement of Foreign publications, their transportation, storage, translation, and the intelligence exploitation thereof will be infeasible.

b. ASDIC should be the focal point for the concentration of surviving, intelligence knowledgeable, language and technical experts.

c. The CIA Deputy at ASDIC would be in a position to make the determination, as the appropriate point in time, when the establishment of a separate foreign publications center should be considered from the viewpoints of feasibility and need.

d. The functions of the two USIB committees on Procurement of Foreign Publications and Exploitation of Foreign Language Publications should be combined and satisfied through the CIA contingent organic and ASDIC.

3. I recommend that similar basic emergency planning philosophies be solicited from all members of the committee, ~~and that a working group be solicited from all members of the committee,~~ and that a working group be established to collate and synthesize the results into a final agreed plan.


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